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Chapter 6: The Historical Trajectory of a Peripheral National Business System  
Maria Kapsali and Rea Prouska  
Introduction: Challenging Presumptions in Peripheral National Business Systems    
The recent global financial crisis has revealed that the application of ahistorical and grossly 
generalized lessons and methods from studies on core National Business Systems (NBS) to understand 
countries on the European periphery does not generate explanations about the ‘leaping’ back and forth 
of systems from the periphery to the semi-periphery. Research on peripheral countries is limited, and 
most NBS literature focuses on advanced-core or semi-peripheral systems. There have been several 
studies on Asian peripheral countries, including China, Japan, Hong Kong and South Korea (Witt and 
Reading, 2012; Černíková, 2010; Bendt and Sanne, 2010; Tipton, 2009; Carney, 2005; Yeung, 2000; 
Whitley, 1991) as well as comparative studies (Casson and Lundan, 1999) and fewer studies on 
European and South American peripheral countries in the last decade (Gabrisch et al., 2012; 
Černíková, 2010; Psychogios and Szamosi, 2007; Amable, 2003). Furthermore, the definition of 
‘periphery’ in these studies has been confusing, as the same economies have sometimes been 
perceived as peripheral and sometimes as semi-peripheral or core (Italy and Spain). For example, the 
European periphery was thought to comprise the countries of Eastern Europe (the Balkans, including 
Greece) or the former Soviet Empire (Poland), while countries on the European semi-periphery are 
declining cores – Portugal, Spain Italy, southern Germany, and southern France (Chase-Dunn, Kawana 
and Brewer, 2000). However, other studies include Greece as part of the semi-periphery (Prokou, 
2003; Wallerstein, 1976, 1997).  
Careful analysis of (semi)peripheral NBS is frustrated by two presumptions embedded in the 
study of core NBS: 1) the presumption of coherence; 2) the presumption of stability, which is used to 
study the status of (semi)peripheral NBS. Peripheral NBS, however, are often characterized by 
incoherence and instability due to their continuous exposure to asymmetric external forces. These 
presumptions have been challenged by two currents of thought in the NBS literature: 1) ‘segmented’ 
NBS; 2) the exploration of longitudinal and other types of historical change. As yet, no attempt has 
been made to examine both currents in greater historical depth.  
This chapter challenges these presumptions by using a historical approach to analyse and 
explain the behaviour and development of a ‘leaping’ peripheral/semi-peripheral NBS (Greece). This 
represents a renewed call for ‘more history and less systems’ in the comparative analysis of 
capitalisms (Martin, 2008), especially on the periphery (Fellman et al., 2008), and we will show that 
the use of this model requires an understanding of historical sequence.  
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The next section will examine the ways that NBS studies deal with the issues of incoherence 
and instability and will explain our approach to critical junctures in segmented NBS institutions.  
Theoretical framework – the segmented NBS  
The NBS model shows the ways that institutions merge into a cumulative bundle of economic activity 
to support organizational practices (Morgan, 2007). However it is an ‘ideal’ type of institutional 
model, constructed eclectically in order to avoid the infinite combinations of institutional components 
(Whitley 1999, 2000). This ideal model makes sense only out of the structures of advanced systems 
presumed to be ‘coherent’, where institutional parts function in close interdependence with each other 
based on the premise of self-reinforcing integration and unidirectional relationships that achieve 
optimal wealth-maximizing results (Lundvall, 1999; Mayer and Wittington, 1999). In reality, an NBS 
is neither a coherent nor an optimal system; rather it is an evolutionary system with many interfaces 
and paths of action that develop through time. Ideal configurations that are ‘optimal’, ‘stable’ and 
‘coherent’ by definition do not sufficiently explain why institutional paths in highly volatile 
environments are likely to be ‘crooked’ (Djelic and Quark, 2007) or the effects of (re)combinations of 
institutional interests and the accumulation of struggles in developmental paths.  
To deal with the presumption of incoherence, studies have looked into systems that are 
profoundly non-optimal. Djelic and Quark (2007), Martin (2008) and Wood and Frynas (2006) 
propose a model of the ‘segmented NBS’, a distinct variety of capitalism that is not wealth-
maximizing with low degrees of complementarity but is sustained because it serves specific interests – 
usually elites, often foreign ones (Wood and Frynas, 2006).  
The focus on internal coherence leaves little room for explaining change (Brookes et al., 
2005), as it produces relatively static paradigms within which dynamic features are primarily 
explained by means of institutional reproduction (Herrigel, 2006). Instability is explained by the 
cumulative effects of subtle, incremental and transformative change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; 
Thelen, 2003), neglecting other types of change, such as flux (frequent and turbulent change; see 
Burnes, 2004). Some studies delve into the history of particular NBS, but not all of them are academic 
(Amatori et al., 2011) and many of them explore longitudinal change but not historical development 
(De Jong et al., 2010; Tengblad and Ohlsson, 2010). Highly volatile systems such as peripheral NBS 
need to be accurately portrayed if their instability is to be understood.   
Since peripheral NBS are neither coherent, stable nor optimal, they should logically be 
regarded as segmented. The segmented NBS model was created to explain incoherence in all types of 
NBS; however, weak and underperforming peripheral NBS, which are admittedly incoherent and 
unstable, are suitable for analysis. 
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Context and method: legacies within segmented NBS paths  
As our aim is to use a historical approach to challenge the presumptions of coherence and stability in 
peripheral NBS, we will assess the formation of various legacies using Hotho’s (2009) four 
institutional indicators of a segmented NBS: the role of the state, labour/skills, finances and firm 
structure.  
The use of legacies requires an analysis of earlier political-economic choices that shape the 
costs and benefits of embarking on certain institutional paths (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000; Mazzoleni, 
1997). We will examine the ways that legacies form, develop or change institutional paths at critical 
junctures (Deeg, 2005). Junctures are points in time at which significant systemic changes occur and 
that host interfaces between institutional paths (Frenkel and Shenhav, 2006), showing that history 
matters (Gourley, 2008; Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000; Thelen, 2003). By exploring the historical 
transition of Hotho’s four NBS indicators through legacies, we will identify recurring institutional 
practices and more clearly describe the historical development of a peripheral-segmented NBS. 
Studies that use aggregate measures, such as trade globalization (Chase-Dunn, Kawana and Brewer, 
2000), are less sensitive to historical causality since such measures produce relatively stable core-
periphery hierarchies with limited mobility.  
We will use the case of the Greek NBS on the periphery of the EU, summarizing its historical 
trajectory over the past 170 years, based on information obtained from 13 empirical studies on the 
country’s institutions and managerial practices (Prouska and Kapsali, 2011). We will examine three 
critical junctures at which the NBS entered a new historical ‘era’ and use the legacies created in each 
era to explain segmentation: 1) establishment of the independent Greek state and its gradual expansion 
from 1830 to 1900; 2) intense change and warfare from 1900 to 1974; 3) restoration of democracy and 
formation of the contemporary Greek NBS from 1974 to the present. These junctures were selected 
because they marked radical shifts in governance with respect to policies, regimes and systems of 
economic production.  
The segmented Greek business system during the past 170 years  
Two legacies at three junctures  
Greece has been subject to constant political change and conflict during regimes that ranged from rigid 
dictatorships to occupations and monarchies between 1830 and 1974 (Kapsali and Butler, 2011; 
Maddison, 1995). The role of the state changed radically at the three critical junctures, creating two 
legacies that channelled institutional development into a segmented whole.    
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Legacy I: the power broker state  
The first legacy involves the role of the state as a ‘power broker’ (Table 6.1), a mediating entity 
between national and foreign interests, a role that lasted during the first two critical junctures. The 
‘power broker’ legacy stems from persistent historical patterns of external interference. At the third 
critical juncture, the role of the state shifts to being the ‘patron of the electorate’, as monarchist and 
centralist regimes transition to socialism. However, the role of the state eased the path of corrupt 
internal politics and failed to create the cessation processes that are necessary to ensure 
interdependencies and complementarities among business entities.  
Legacy II: sociopolitical and economic division  
The second legacy is a historically consistent pattern of political, economic and social division 
throughout contemporary history (Jesse, 2007). The division emerged from the autocratic patronage 
role of the state, led to several civil wars, favoured the interests of elites and caused political 
distortions, incoherence and instability, ultimately leading to segmentation in the NBS (Kapsali and 
Butler, 2011). The division was exacerbated by the internalization of change after every exogenous 
shock, especially when foreign interference was involved, generating colliding social conflicts and 
creating a highly volatile environment. The repercussions of this legacy for NBS institutions involved 
continuous disruption and partisanship in domestic politics, policies and institutions, as well as the 
marginalization vis-à-vis public and other institutional resources of a large part of the private sector 
not politically aligned with the state.    
Critical juncture I: 1830-1900  
The role of the state  
The ‘power broker’ legacy starts with the establishment of the modern Greek state in 1830 (Table 6.1). 
From the very beginning, Greek affairs were subject to foreign influence. The major European 
political forces of the time were Britain, France and Russia, referred to as the ‘Great Powers’, which 
actively interfered in domestic affairs as if dealing with colonies. As an envoy of Britain, Lord Byron, 
predicted that “an ‘independent’ Greece would be a colony of the sovereigns of Europe” and the 
British ambassador in Athens was quoted as saying in 1841 that “Greece is either Russian or English 
and, since she must not be Russian, she must be English...” (Sarafis, 1990: 124). Dependency on the 
Great Powers with Britain as a leader was twofold: they saw to it that London’s financial houses (the 
Rothschild bank) provided Greece with independence loans and they appointed a Bavarian king (Otto 
Friedrich Ludwig of Bavaria) while ‘sponsoring’ their own politicians in the Greek parliament.  
The political and financial structures of the new kingdom were feudalistic. As a result, they 
were unable to keep pace with the capitalist structures into which western democratic systems were 
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evolving. The main mistake was the establishment of a public bureaucracy (often referred to as 
Bavarocracy), a western-oriented, hierarchical, centralized, procedural system superimposed on the 
eastern public practices of decentralized political patronage and clientelism (exchange of public 
services and resources through favours among actors with asymmetrical power in informal networks) 
that had been the norm under the Ottoman regime for 400 years. Thus, the Bavarian bureaucracy did 
not make processes transparent but created a hybrid system of overlapping corrupt practices.   
Labour/skills, finances and firm structures  
Piperopoulos (2009) writes that industrialization during this period was characterized by a lack of 
specialization in production capabilities or supply chain activities, as well as random industrial 
production. Land redistribution policies exacerbated the problem of fragmented productivity. The state 
taxed civilians and small businesses heavily to repay war debts and failed to invest in industrial 
infrastructures or substantially empower and regulate private investment. As a result, economic 
production remained agrarian and small-scale; the peasant class, which represented the majority, was 
cut off from specialized, vocational or tertiary education and began to emigrate (Table 6.3). Unlike 
industrialized economies where a strong middle class owned most investment capital and exercised 
political power (Table 6.2), the Greek middle class was small, politically marginalized and reluctant to 
invest in industrial production. They invested in non-industrialized sectors such as trade services and 
marine commerce for quick profits, as well as low-risk industries like weaving (Limberakis, 1991; 
Αgriandonis, 1986). Small-scale industrial firms obtained state resources through clientelism and bank 
loans, relying on the import of technology and knowledge. Firms did not develop the critical mass 
required for industrial clusters, they emerged opportunistically and remained small (Demiris, 1991; 
Limberakis, 1991). Family businesses dominated because industry was unable to develop 
collaborative infrastructures (Αgriandonis, 1991) (Table 6.4).   
However, commercial and agricultural productivity expanded rapidly, demonstrating that the 
country had capacity for growth. But industrialization stemmed mostly from the initiatives of a few 
entrepreneurs and elites rather than from systematic, organized activity, and small-scale production 
was insufficient to compete in wider markets. Greek productivity was so fragmented and haphazard 
that cumulative economic growth was too weak to overcome debts and deficits (Kabouroglou, 1985). 
As a consequence, the economy was insolvent by 1890.  
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Critical juncture II: 1900-1974  
The role of the state  
Due to its peripheral location, Greece went through an extremely turbulent period, including the 
Balkan Wars (1912-1913), two world wars (1914-1918; 1939-1945), a national catastrophe (1922) as a 
result of war with Turkey, 13 military coups during the National Schism (1924-1935), the Great 
Depression (1929), the Civil War (1945-1950), the Cold War (1950-1970) and a seven-year 
dictatorship (1963-1974) (Kapsali and Butler, 2011). The country had been in war for most of the 
twentieth century, with 34 isolated years that were free of serious domestic or external conflict. The 
pattern of dependency continued during this period, including more war, reconstruction debts and 
heavy external interference in domestic affairs, especially by the United States after the Civil War 
(Weiner, 2007; Legg, 1969), leading to loss of internal control and often of sovereignty as well. The 
country was exploited in various ways by its allies, adding to violent conflicts between the externally 
imposed monarch and the population. These conflicts consumed the resources of the state while 
continually fragmenting business infrastructures and institutions.   
The state continued to play the role of the power broker, this time as an intermediary between 
conflicting or overlapping domestic and foreign vested interests. Governments backed up the police 
state and distorted democratic processes. State regimes and economic philosophy, as well as policy 
formation and implementation, changed so many times that the only efficient way of conducting 
business was by means of clientelist and particularistic practices (Taylor-Gooby, 2006) allied with 
personal networks, and with the public sector as the main distributor of resources (Table 6.1). Thus, 
the absence of a stable, sovereign political order had a segmenting effect on business practices.  
Labour/skills, finances and firm structures  
Business institutions were frequently disrupted during these 74 years. Such disruptions stunted 
business growth – the fundamental institutional fabric had to be reconstructed and business policies 
had to be reconstituted a number of times (Demiris, 1991). To compensate for the lack of coherence 
and stability and to sustain business expansion, governments either borrowed money or pursued 
protectionist or devaluation policies. They also used supranational institutions and programmes 
(Marshall Plan, Bretton Woods) in the 1950s to patch together the missing business infrastructures. 
The use of external institutions created some stability for business during times of relative peace and 
promoted credibility in the market. However, supranational external funds were designed to be 
absorbed and utilized by business systems that already had basic infrastructures and rules of liberal 
capitalism, not to suit the needs of a segmented, incoherent system. Despite the problems, business 
was resilient and high levels of growth were achieved during the three decades between conflicts 
(Polizos and Panagiotopoulos, 1998). Two periods of economic growth exhibited strong 
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entrepreneurial activity, albeit opportunistically (Demiris, 1991; Table 6.2). The first period was after 
the war in 1922, boasting growth of 3.5 per cent (Freris, 1986) mainly due to the influx of educated 
immigrants who started countless small businesses (Hirschon, 2003). The second period was after the 
Civil War from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s, which exhibited impressive economic development 
due to the Marshall Plan, a drastic devaluation of the Drachma, price and import controls, lower 
interest rates, a dynamic chemical industry, tourism, transport service and massive public funding to 
rebuild the transportation infrastructure (Mouzelis, 1978). Growth averaged 7 per cent, second only to 
Japan. Growth was highest in the 1950s and often exceeded 10 per cent in the 1960s (Maddison, 
1995).          
Greece adopted the Fordist model of industrial production, though not fully implementing it, 
and achieved a modest peripheral position in the international economy (Vasiliadis, 2008). The 
economy still resembled underdeveloped capitalism, with low agricultural production and bureaucratic 
public administration in control of most bank accounts and directly or indirectly managing the 
insurance industry through the National Bank and Commercial Bank (Piperopoulos, 2009; 
Choumanidis, 1990). Both internal and direct investments were primarily financed by the state, the 
industrial sector was unable to grow due to sluggish investment activity, and population movements 
destabilized the labour, further discouraging investment and weakening the education system 
(Iakovidis, 1998). For these reasons, the vast majority of businesses were family-owned and had 
trouble competing due to the lack of investment in modernization. The gap between these businesses 
and the few politically connected and oligopolistic larger businesses widened (Piperopoulos, 2009; 
Tsouflidis, 2003; Kostis, 1999).  
Critical juncture III: 1974-2010  
The role of the state  
Radical changes occurred in 1974 – the restoration of parliamentary democracy, abolition of the 
monarchy, elimination of the army’s interference in politics, reconciliation with political prisoners and 
refugees, participation in the European Union and resistance to the intense influence of the United 
States (Kapsali and Butler, 2011). Another radical shift occurred in 1981 when socialist governments 
took over, leading to the establishment of welfare institutions.  
Although the effort to restore internal order and oppose external interference was very 
successful, the role of the state shifted from being a ‘power broker’ for the elite to serving as a ‘patron 
of the electorate’ (Table 6.1). In essence, governments used patronage practices in the public sector to 
provide the general electorate, not just the elites, with employment and access to business resources. 
Such economic redistribution, which reduced social and economic inequalities, confronted 
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governments with the dilemma of trying to satisfy conflicting objectives, including economic growth, 
the resolution of social conflicts and re-election.  
The ‘patron’ state role led to: a) more intense distortions in the structure of business 
institutions sustained by debt; b) division of society into two factions (those who had access to 
business resources and the opposition who did not), this time in the political arena. A string of 
governments enjoyed relatively short lives and changed business policies in arbitrary ways.  
Labour/skills, finances and firm structures  
Three significant milestones marked the evolution of a segmented business system after 1974: welfare 
reforms and policy discontinuity, an enormous public debt and reliance on European patronage, all of 
which led to poor performance (Othelen et al., 2003). Post-1974 governments created market 
distortions (radical socialist policies that led to a steep increase in labour costs, a semi-regulated 
financial system, public monopolies, nationalization, subsidies, expansion of public administration and 
a supply-driven system based on investment grants and EC transfers) that not only discouraged private 
investment but destabilized the balance of payments and made it impossible to control inflation 
(Alogoskoufis et al., 1996).  
One cause of economic deterioration was the lack of the kinds of complementarities between 
the government, labour market, investment and businesses (Table 6.2) able to absorb the tremors of 
economic and social ‘shocks’ (Alogoskoufis et al., 1996; Vasiliadis 2008). Socialist governments after 
1981 eventually pursued policies to promote dialogue between ‘social partners’ in the NBS 
(employers-labour-finance-skills), including the healthcare system, pension funds, trade unions, 
regulations to support investment in the stock market, and education reform (Tables 6.2 and 6.3). 
However, the ‘social partners’ perpetuated the culture of partisanship, corporatism and polarization, 
failing to reach consensus on more progressive policies (Charalambis et al., 2004) making labour 
highly expensive and leading to political inertia (Venieris, 2003). In addition, these policies 
encountered opposition or were incompletely adopted due either to the public bureaucracy or to the 
lack of familiarity among small family firms with these kinds of practices (Table 6.4). Because the 
public sector was used to rein in political opposition through the control and distribution of state 
resources, it remained a source of corruption and mistrust of government. As a result, redistribution 
was inequitable, leading to the highest percentage of employers and self-employed people in the EU 
(sustaining the black economy and compromising price-wage flexibility) at the expense of private 
sector employees (Timmer et al., 2007).  
Although economically important industries grew (Polizos and Panagiotopoulos, 1998), the 
NBS still performed poorly. However, poor performance was not correlated with low productivity but 
with the large ‘black economy, extremely regressive taxation system, high labour costs and lack of 
8 
 
investment in modern technology (Oltheten et al., 2003). Poor performance was also linked to the 
lopsided business sector: a large service sector, along with small agricultural and industrial sectors, 
which shaped demand for particular types of labour (Piperopoulos, 2009), and the elimination of 
protectionist and monetary policies, which meant higher costs after the adoption of the euro in 1999.  
Discussion: Implications of legacies in the segmented peripheral Greek NBS  
We have been discussing segmentation of the Greek peripheral system due to political practices 
historically that are embedded in legacies and that create internal incoherence and instability. We have 
also discussed maintenance of the segmented system despite the lack of complementarities.  
The two legacies bind the NBS together in a segmented structure. At the source of this 
segmentation is the division of the economy into private and public sectors that compete for (mainly 
public) resources. The patronage role of the state and its clientelist practices have constantly used the 
public sector to eclectically distribute resources to the private sector, leading to corruption and the 
black economy, weak infrastructures and alienated firms at every juncture (see Figure 1). The internal 
division was exacerbated by external interference, which is supposed to be absent in semi-peripheral 
systems. The division within this segmented system is so deep that the phenomenon replicates itself in 
a cyclical process – the legacies have to change in order for social practices (and the institutions that 
regulate them) to be acculturated into a new modus operandi (Clogg, 2002).  
Segmentation in the Greek NBS consistently exhibited a lack of complementarities (Kang, 
2006), creating a fragmented, risk-averse industrial landscape. Firms remained small, mostly service-
oriented, and relied on bank loans or personal investment, unless there were clientelist connections to 
public structures as compensation for the absence of formal institutional support. Thus the average 
small firm is ‘alienated’ and incompletely integrated with the institutions (Martin, 2008; Figure 1), 
making it more vulnerable to external influence, given constant dependency on external production 
systems, mainly core countries.  
Unlike the argument of NBS theory according to which this cycle can be broken by radical 
reforms (Wood and Frynas, 2006), persistence of the legacies neutralized radical political and 
socioeconomic reforms at the second and third critical junctures. Even though reforms temporarily 
improved institutional performance at these junctures, which explains the ‘leaping’ between periphery 
and semi-periphery, neither legacy that had caused institutional failure changed and the system 
remained segmented. Efforts by post-1974 governments to change legacies by means of European 
institutional rules were unsuccessful due to the lack of complementarities and other ‘clumsy’ 
institutions (Gourley, 2008) to support these rules. Any attempts by governments to create 
complementarities and clumsy institutions were inhibited by public actors, preserving legacies since 
the first critical juncture. Importing rules from a supranational institutional system into the segmented 
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NBS ultimately failed to change business practices. Rather than altering or replacing current practices 
the new institutional rules either reinforced the legacies or became inactive.  
Further analysis of (semi-)peripheral NBS that is sensitive to the particularities of their 
internal and external power struggles and links to core countries might reveal that our assumptions are 
inaccurate (Featherstone, 1998). Take the example of the transferability of, or compliance with, EU 
regulations at the last critical juncture. A facile conclusion would be that Greece’s current financial 
crisis is the result of deception on the part of the government, given that structural inefficiencies were 
concealed by the statistical and economic reports provided to the EU when entering the Eurozone. 
However this perspective is based on the assumption that the EU had no knowledge of the consistent 
historical structural and performance inadequacies of peripheral systems like Greece. The fact that 
several peripheral systems with well-known structural deficiencies –Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece 
and Spain (PIIGS) – were accepted and placed in the ‘central zone of the euro’ suggests that the EU 
was aware of such vulnerabilities but accepted the risk, mainly because they intended to take control 
of these economies by saddling them with more debt in the case of crisis. This raises the question of 
whether such politics are a new form of ‘colonialism through debt’ by which the repositioning of a 
segmented NBS from a peripheral to a semi-peripheral status subjects it to suboptimal financialization 
of its economy, leading to the subsequent economic and political dependency to its creditors.  
For example, the assertion that the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural 
funds sustained Greece is an exaggeration, as they comprised only 3 per cent of GDP and much of it 
remained unabsorbed due to segmentation. However, the bail-out debt imposed as the inevitable result 
of economic submission to the pressure of keeping up with the core countries gives the EU leverage to 
proceed with extraordinary political interventions in the policies of peripheral countries. In the recent 
case of Cyprus, such intervention involved the illegal confiscation of private property – 40 per cent of 
private deposits (above EUR 100,000) – which economic theory defines as a gross abuse of 
government power (even though the EU is not the government). This marks the beginning of a new 
legacy. Lagarde characterized this theft as "a lasting, durable and fully financed solution", suggesting 
that it might turn into a more frequent tactic to address the institutional failures of other peripheral and 
semi-peripheral economies and raise questions about the kind of political and economic intervention 
that stems directly from dependence on ‘debt politics’. Theft of private property from peripheral 
systems unable to hold out against their creditors could easily continue, and the only question is which 
ailing NBS is next in line for this type of treatment. The opposite example of the peripheral PIIGS is 
Iceland, which refused ‘interventions’ that included austerity measures and punishment of private 
citizens. Iceland overcame a debt ratio of 240 per cent by reducing institutional corruption and helping 
citizens and businesses to recover. Alternatives exist and can be implemented.  
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Figure 6.1:  Legacies and paths creating the Greek segmented peripheral NBS. Source: the authors  
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Conclusion: the future of the peripheral NBS  
We started this chapter by challenging prevailing perceptions about (semi-)peripheral NBS and 
exploring their historical development in order to explain why they cannot be classified correctly. We 
presented an explanation of an NBS that leaps from the semi-periphery to periphery through an 
analysis of the historical development of institutional segmentation and lack of coherence and stability 
instead of resorting to aggregate measures, such as trade globalization, that are less sensitive to 
historical causality and upward or downward mobility within NBS hierarchies. We suggest that 
adoption of a more historical segmented approach may not only explain the reasons for the position in 
the hierarchies but disclose more variation within this hierarchy, as well as many outliers that are 
currently assigned to one position or another. This is a significant topic for future research on 
peripheral systems: how their legacies affect their institutional development and status in the global 
system.  
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 Table 6.1: The path of the role of the state with indicators by Hotho (2009) (evidence from Prouska and Kapsali, 2011)  
 
 
 
 
State 1830-1900   
Debt and political patronage – foreign kings 
and foreign policies – government is an 
intermediary  
1900-1974 1974 – 2010   
EU patronage, supranational ‘allies’ and pressures of global 
competition – the government is a negotiator – low investment 
and debt crisis    
1900-1950 
Violent interventions and 
periodic loss of control – 
divisions  
1950-1974 
Control of the 
economy and civil 
society – divisions 
Role, policies 
and public 
administrati
on  
Elites and 
power 
structures  
 
Foreign political patrons - the ‘Great Powers’ 
– control domestic affairs – the patrons chose 
foreign kings as head of state  
Public sector: Ottoman-style government 
corruption hybridized with Bavarian hierarchy 
allocates resources using patronage and 
clientelist relations with elites    
Feudalist policies are not modern by foreign 
standards – policies (education, investment) -
land redistribution set back initiatives for 
industrialization  
Due to patrons wars (Balkan 
wars, world wars, Civil War, 
Depression, Cold War, etc.) 
and civil disputes (National 
Schism, military coups), 
state infrastructure were 
destroyed several times – no 
continuity of industrial 
policy – constant 
reconstruction – debts  
Flux back and forth 
intensifies partisanship and 
corruption  
King, military, state 
wars, recurring regime 
change, government 
infighting lead to 
dictatorship   
The United States 
replaced the British and 
European allies as the 
new ‘patron’ – invasion 
of Cyprus and 
interference in domestic 
affairs  
 
Restoration of democracy using foreign Central European models 
(French and German), abolition of monarchy, Europeanization of the 
state – the EU replaced the patronage of the Great Powers and the 
United States – compliance with EU rules and policies  
Relative political stability, but still social division – a legacy of 
mistrust and fractured class/political divisions. Redistribution policies 
used for reconciliation – social unrest when the state tries to cut back 
– no overall design or policy continuity 
Legacy of clientelist relationship with the electorate  
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Table 6.2: The path of the financial institutions with indicators by Hotho (2009) (evidence from Prouska and Kapsali, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
systems 
1830-1900  
War debts and insolvency – 
missed opportunity for 
industrialization   
1900-1974 1974-2010  
Emergence of middle-class investors- credit-based 
financing and savings dominate – market-based stock 
exchange boost that collapsed due to weak regulation  
1900-1950 
Loss of control with periodic 
revivals – more debts – periodic 
boosts 
1950-1974 
Regaining control – credit-
based booms 
Sources of 
financing  
Debt or market  
 
Production and 
market 
investment  
The economy started functioning 
with a deficit due to war debts to 
London banks  
Due to lack of investment, the 
country had to rely on recurring 
debts   
Land redistribution confined 
investment to small plots – lack 
of middle-class investors and 
poor market financing   
Trade, shipping, sporadic 
industrialisation based on funds 
from political elites – or loans  
Markets and production destroyed 
by recurring wars  
State unable to repay loans, loss of 
markets (domestic and foreign) – 
further debt  
Lack of investment due to war 
shocks – the state used monetary 
policies to raise revenues – more 
debt  
Injection of labour through mass 
immigration led to short boom for 
small businesses – retail-oriented  
Marshall Plan partly 
implemented  
Protectionist policies lead to 
rapid business development  
Boosts industries – economy 
enters a capitalist phase with 
high levels of investment in 
industry, tax credits and 
protectionism, and the 
emergence of monopolies – 
investment still credit-based  
Businesses continue to invest 
little – opportunistic 
industrialization– service sector  
Reallocation of industrial sectors – agriculture gradually 
disappears , weak industrial and innovation sectors – service 
boosts  
State used monetary policies to attract investment and to 
make services competitive until the euro was adopted 
Redistribution policies due to social divisions – led to 
savings rather than stock market investment – black economy  
Self-employment, no large companies to invest, mainly 
SMEs  
Did not attract much investment  
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Table 6.3: The path of the labour institutions (education, training, unions) with indicators by Hotho (2009) (evidence from Prouska and Kapsali, 2011)  
 
 
 
 
Skills development 
system 
1830-1900  
Educating the illiterate 
masses  
1900 – 1974  
Influx of educated people – establishment of education 
but not for business professions  
1974 – 2010  
Increase in university education, asymmetric labour pool, incomplete 
protection of workers    
State of literacy, 
labour pool  
Strength of 
education and 
training systems 
(availability and 
accessibility of 
education) 
 
Diaspora of educated people  
Population is illiterate, 
uneducated – confined to 
agrarian professions  
Adoption of a free education 
system, modernization of 
language  
Gradual population growth 
cannot create predictable 
skills policies   
Destruction of Smyrna, huge influx of new labour refugees 
contributes to business and banking, they are well-educated 
and entrepreneurial, labour became cheaper, small 
businesses rise 
Frequent changes to government inhibited a long-term 
education policy for business and industrial professions – 
classical ‘professional’ education (doctors, lawyers, etc.) 
was preferred  
Until the 1950s – investment in skills lagged behind 
industrial development 
Changes in market practices, unstable labour markets, 
cannot industrialize  
No social welfare for the unemployed, but establishment of 
insurance and pension systems  
No calibration of market demand and education planning  
Most of the population is educated (undergraduate and postgraduate 
degrees), educated foreign labour, new skills (services), vocational 
education weak (little in-house training)  
Increased labour costs due to social policies, unionization and poor demand 
for many business-related professions lead to high unemployment among 
educated young people   
Policies for unemployment and protection of employee rights improved but 
were not fully implemented. Insurance and pensions needed to be reformed 
Greater demand for tertiary education spawns controversy over private 
university education – a great deal of income spent at foreign universities  
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Trust and 
relations with 
authorities 
1830-1900  
Unregulated power distance– family 
craft and trade businesses  
1900-1974  
Formation of structures – some medium-
size industries – majority   
1974-2010  
Structures continue to bear power conflicts – employer/employee regulations, 
efforts for gender equality and similar policies only partially implemented – 
marginal unemployment policies – family businesses continue to dominate  
Business 
practices of 
authorities – 
power distance  
Willingness to 
delegate 
decision-making  
Faith in formal 
institutions  
Bavarocracy, the rule of patronage and 
bribery  
Autocratic leadership and family-
oriented structures – great power 
distance, not much delegation  
Trade, shipping, no industrialization, 
short-term orientation and 
opportunistic emergence of industry  
Bavarocracy lives on, the state becomes the 
main employer  
Small family businesses dominate the private 
sector  
Start of larger enterprises/demand for more 
professional expertise  
Social divisions/great power distance between 
public and private workers and employers     
 
Public sector organizations, the state is now the largest employer that generates 
debt  
SMEs unable to work in cooperatives or clusters due to lack of intermediary 
institutions and mistrust/greater distance between SMEs and larger oligopolistic 
firms  
Labour and social security policies still not fully implemented – great power 
distance – autocratic practices /series of strikes and industrial actions 
 
 
Table 6.4: The path of the firms’ institutionalized practices with indicators by Hotho (2009) (evidence from Prouska and Kapsali, 2011) 
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